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BY
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE

THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION

12:00 NOON
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1976
RENAISSANCE ROOM
BILTMORE HOTEL
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

I welcome the opportunity to talk with you briefly about
some unfinished items on the Department of Justice agenda.

It

is the nature of a living system of law that there always is
an unfinished agenda.

The items

ch~nge,

of course1 some

problems do get solved; others perhaps always will remain.
Reviewing the agenda--something we do in one sense every day
in the Department--is a way of thinking about priorities for
the future.

In this talk I will be able to touch upon only a

few such items, such as the development of electronic surveillance
policy, the formulation of FBI guidelines, the reconsideration
of prosecutorial discretion and the clarification of anti
discrimination law.

There are many facets of these and other

important items I will have to ignore.

In my view one para

mount concern must always guide our way.

This is the keeping

of the faith in the essential decency and even-handedness in
the law, a faith which is the strength of the law and which must
be continually renewed or else it is lost.

This has been a cen

tral principle which my colleagues and I have kept as our first con
cern.

In a society that too easily accepts the notion that every

thing can be manipulated, it is important to make clear that the
administration of federal justice seeks to be impartial and fair
and that these qualities are not inconsistent with being effective.

Related to this is a willingness to confront hard

~roblems.

Some of these problems relate to questions of administration
of the law where discretionary limits have been inadequately
defined or enforced.

Others involve the evolution of a

guiding legal theory where conflicting legal doctrines, ambigu
ously stated, respond inadequately to the solution of social
problems.

Still others may raise issues which must be explored

in depth if our constitutional system is to receive the care it
deserves.

with respect to this last kind of issue, the Depart

ment, as you will

recal~

in the Buckley v. Valeo election case

went to the extreme of filing in the united States Supreme
court two briefs - one which we termed a pure amicus brief
discussing the issues on both sides.

This move was not exactly

unprecedented, but it was highly unusuaL

I like to think,

however, that it was highly proper and in our best traditions,
even in our adversary system.
One area in which the process of rethinking began very
early concerns the standards and procedures by which intelligence
agencies should operate.

I vividly recall that quite late in

the afternoon on my first day as Attorney General this issue
arose immediately.

Just as I was settling into my chair and

observing the handsome wood paneling of the office, an FBI
agent appeared at my door without announcement.

He put before

me a piece of paper asking my authorization for the installation

of a wiretap without court order and he waited for my approval.
For close to 40 years the Department of Justice had been called
upon to undertake electronic surveillance in certain cases
without prior judicial approval.

But I thought it was a bit

unusual that I was expected to sign so automatically, if that
really was the expectation.

I asked the agent to leave the

request with me--I think, perhaps, to his surprise--so that
I could consult other officials in the Department.
...

This experience was one of many that led us to explore
~mmediately

the question of how procedures could be perfected

in this world of inevitable secrecy.

Important steps in the

process of reconsidering electronic surveillance and other
'intrusions in foreign intelligence cases had already been taken
before I became Attorney General. I want to stress that.

But

it has received a great deal of our attention ever since.
The Department of Justice undertakes electronic surveillance
in this kind of case without a prior judicial warrant because
:the curious shape of the law as it reacted to necessities of
our time includes an assumption that it will.

The statute pro-

viding for judicial warrants for electronic surveillance in
criminal cases--the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets

Act of 1968 -- expressly reserves from its requirements
surveillances conducted pursuant to the constitutional power
of the President to collect foreign intelligence information.
The Supreme Court and the united States Courts of Appeals
which have considered the matter have either held that the
Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant for electronic
surveillance instituted to collect foreign intelligence or have
reserved the question.

In the leading Supreme Court case

the Keith case decided in 1972,which held that the Fourth
Amendment required a warrant in cases in which there was no
significant foreign involvement -- Justice Powell emphasized
that "this case involved only the domestic aspects of national
security.

We have expressed no opinion as to the issues which

may be involved with respect to the activities of foreign
powers or their agents."

Justice Powell's

~tatement

was set

against a background in which such surveillances were undertaken,
were known - I would say expected - to have taken place over
many years.

Shortly after the Keith decision Attorney General

Elliot Richardson reaffirmed the practice.

In a September 12,

1973, letter to Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Attorney General Richardson wrote:
believe there will continue

"I

to be situations which justify the

conduct of electronic surveillance for the purposes of national
security.

This surveillance is carried out to meet the

obligations of the President as both Commander-in-Chief and
as the Nation's instrument for foreign affairs.

I will

continue to attempt to ensure that a genuine national security
interest is, in fact, involved whenever we invoke this power
and that we operate within the limits set by Congress and the
courts."
Foreign intelligence warrantless electronic surveillance
has been a matter touched upon by legislation, passed upon or
avoided by courts, and has been the responsibility of
Executive.

th~

Our belief was that a more coherent policy, ex

pressed in judicial decisions, legislation, executive regulation
or some better combination of these

element~

was required.

An

understanding of the use of Presidential power in this area and
the development of procedures to direct its use have been made
more difficult because of the secrecy which has prevailed about
the practice for 35 years.
has been difficult.

Open and informed public discussion

Much of the secrecy is necessary.

Against this background we consciously took every available
opportunity to the extent proper to discuss publicly our
policies with respect to electronic surveillance.
useful to reiterate them now.

It may be

Under the standards and procedures

established by President Ford, the personal approval of the
Attorney General is required before any non-consensual electronic

surveillance may be instituted within the United States
without a judicial warrant.

All requests for surveillance

must be made in writing by the Director of the FBI and must
set forth the relevant justifying circumstances.

Both the

agency and the Presidential appointee initiating the request
must be identified.

It is the policy of the Department that

all requests now come to the attention of the Attorney General
only after they have been extensively reviewed by the FBI,
an official in the Criminal Division, and a special review
group established within the Office of the Attorney General.
In addition, a committee composed of four Presidential
appointees in the Department is consulted on cases which present
new factual situations.

Each request, before authorization or

denial, receives my personal attention.
are warrantless wiretaps

Under no circumstances

or electronic surveillance directed

against any individual without probable cause to believe he is
a conscious agent or collaborator of a foreign power.

The

probable cause must exist before the electronic surveillance
is used.

A year and one-half ago I publicly stated that there

were no outstanding instances of warrantless taps or electronic
surveillance directed against American citizens.

There

is stil

none today, although if the proper showing were made such a
surveillance would be possible.

As discussions with interested congressional committees
continued and as our own thinking developed, it

wa~ dete~ined

that legislation providing a warrant mechanism shaped to meet
the particular problems of foreign intelligence, fitting
constitutional standards and offering a measure of reassurance
to the public could be drafted.

The President, after consulta

tion with members of'congress, proposed legislation early this
year to provide a procedure for the issuance of warrants for
foreign intelligence electronic surveillance.

This legislation,

after considerable negotiation and alteration by the Department
of Justice and Senate leaders, overwhelmingly passed both the
Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee.
The Congress adjourned before enacting this significant legis
lation.

Of course I don't know whether it will ever be enacted

or not.
There is not time today to describe the bill in detail,
but let me sketch briefly its basic features.

It provides a

mechanism by which the Attorney General can apply for an
electronic surveillance warrant to one of seven district court
judges designated by the Chief Justice.

The judge may grant

the order if he finds first that there is probable cause to
believe the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power and second that a named Presidential

appointee confirmed by the Senate has certified that the
information sought is foreign intelligence information that
cannot feasibly be obtained by less intrusive techniques.
The judge must also be satisfied with minimization procedures,
and the surveillance can continue no longer than 90 days
without his renewed approval.
During the course of negotiations between the Department
and the two Senate Committees and between the Department and
intelligence agencies in the executive branch, several specific
concerns were worked out by revision of the bill.

While' it had

been argued that no electronic surveillance of citizens or
permanent resident aliens should be undertaken without a showing
of

probabl~

cause of a criminal violation, the committees

ultimately recognized that this notion was unworkable.
spying such as espionage to obtain trade

secre~or

Foreign

information

about industrial processes may not be a federal criminal viola
tion under the espionag.e law.

Foreign terrorism directed at

private individuals or property might not, under current law,
be federal crimes.

Yet these acts vitally affect the nation's

interests when they are undertaken here pursuant to the direction
of a foreign power.

The ultimate form of the bill, like its original draft,
follows the implied suggestions of Justice Powell in the
Almeida-Sanchez and Keith cases that special procedures and
probable cause standards can be fashioned to meet unique cir
cumstances.

The judge is given the ,responsibility for determin

ing whether there is

probable cause to believe the subject of

the surveillance is a foreign power or agent.

The appropriate

executive official is given the responsibility of certifying
that the information sought is foreign intelligence information.
This distinction is based on a regard for whether a judge or an
executive official with responsibility for foreign relations
or foreign intelligence ought to be held accountable for the
decision.

The bill provides for executive accountability where

judicial determination would be inappropriate, but it gives the
judge the duty to determine whether the executive certification
has been given, and it always places upon the judge the
determination that there is probable cause to find the existence
of the requisite foreign agency.
In the version which was reported to the Senate, the bill
contained provisions which corne very close to requiring probable
cause of a crime before electronic surveillance can be directed
against an American citizen or permanent resident alien.
the standard adopted avoids the risk to basic human

But

liberties

that would exist if the espionage laws were broadened to meet
the need for electronic surveillance.

The development of the legislation has, I believe,
helped to clarify the Department's own policy.

By.its safe

guards, the legislation would give to our citizens the assur
ance that electronic surveillance activities in the United
States would not be conducted unless an independent magistrate
were to find that the application submitted by executive
officials met strict legislative standards.

I hope another

legislative effort will go forward.
In a (different area there is under way, as you know,
a unique effort to articulate guidelines for the investigative
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This is a

major effort, to which Director Kelley and the Bureau have given
the utmost cooperation, to guide investigative conduct, to be
realistic about the exercise of discretion and to impose special
controls to guide sensitive decisions.

As a consequence, the

Bureau is now operating under detailed guidelines in its
domestic security and foreign intelligence and counter
intelligence investigations.

As a result'of the guidelines

and of the Bureaurs own reassessments, the number of domestic
security

inves~igations

few years.

has dramatically dropped in the past

In July, 1973, the FBI had more than 21,000 open

domestic security cases.

By September of this year that

number had been reduced to 626.

Guidelines concerning back

ground employment investigations done at the request of the
White House and at the request of congressional committees and

,
judges have not yet been formally put into effect, but are
already being substantially followed by the Bureau.

As a

protection against abuses of the past, these guidelines
require that the person investigated must give his permission.
Currently, a committee within the department is working on
guidelines concerning cooperation with foreign police and
other overseas aspects pf the Bureau's work, organized crime,
the handling of informants, and the government loyalty
security or, as it is sometimes called, employment suitability
program.

Because of the unprecedented nature of this

~ffort

to establish articulate standards to shape such crucial
decisions as under what circumstances an investigation may
be opened, the process has taken a great deal of time and
work.

But I hope that this important task will continue to

move forward within the Department and in cooperation with
Congress as it begins to attempt to clarify the Bureau's
intelligence jurisdiction.
Like the important decisions about when and how to
investigate a criminal allegation, prosecutorial decisions
such as when to charge an accused, when to bargain for a
guilty plea, when the federal government will prosecute an
individual already prosecuted in state court for a related
offense, and when to grant tmmunity in

~xchange

for testimony

have been largely uncontrolled by articulated standards

and procedures.

It is, I believe, time for a reconsideration

of the practice in these areas.

."

It is a highly controversial

area subject to considerable misunderstanding.

The Department,

through task forces, has begun to look into this issue.

A

thorough revision of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, the first complete
revision in more than 20 years, is nearing completion.

The

manual sets forth the allocation of duties between U.S.
Attorneys' offices and the Department's litigating divisions
and describes the procedures that control the federal prose
cutor's work.

The revision of the manual will soon be qom

pleted and is a major achievement.

But much remains to be

done before the reformulation of policy is completed.
I turn now to a different area of the Department's
concern, one in which the Department shares with other legal
institutions and the society as a whole the most difficult
responsibility.

The law against discrimination has matured

in a period marked by recognition of scarcity and complexity
as the dominant economic and social facts.

Some have per

ceived in its evolution a movement from the principle of
equality of opportunity to a requirement of equality of
result.

This, like all capsule descriptIons, distorts a

complicated reality.
In principle the law demands, not equality of result,
but equality of treatment, without regard to race, color,

.

religion, national origin and sex.

This I take to be the

point of the Supreme Court's continued adherence to the
de jure - de facto distinction in Keyes and other school
desegregation caseS1 of its statements in those cases that
the existence of schools attended predominantly by persons
of one race is not in itself unconstitutional racial dis
crimination; and of the Court's recent holding in Washington
v. Davis that intent to discriminate remains a necessary
element to a claim of unconstitutional employment discrimina
tion by government.

Indeed, although the Court in Davis

suggested the possibility of a distinction between consti
tutional and statutory claims, this also appears to be the
point of the language of the Civil Rights Act.

Title VII,

for example, makes it an "unlawful employment practice . • •
to discriminate against any individual • • • because

2! . . .

race, color, or national origin • • • ," a form of language
that looks, in its ultimate legal standard, to causation and
purpose, and not to effect alone.
But this seemingly fixed principle rides in both theory
and practice on a world of ambiguity.

On the point of

principle itself, on the one side, some courts have held, both
as a constitutional and statutory matter, that persons cannot
be given preferences, simply because they are members of a
minority group that has suffered injustices in the past, over

others who are not.

On the other side, there are those

who have argued with the greatest conviction that-neutral
action, against a background of injustice in the past, can
itself be a form of discrimination -- that the Constitution
and laws can recognize no distinction between action purpose
fully designed to achieve and enforce discrimination, and
ostensibly neutral action that knows, accepts, and fails to
act to avoid the consequences in the operation of
the schools or in the granting of jobs, of a long history
of discrimination by all parts of our society.
The confusion on principle is fueled by the reality of
the law in practice.

Justice Stevens made the point in his

concurring opinion in the Davis case that the continued
insistence on the element of intent could, in practice, have
no consequence at all, that everything would depend on the
proof required to establish the forbidden purpose.

He was

speaking to a problem pervasive in this area of the law.
Thus, in the Keyes case, the Supreme Court held that, once
the plaintiff in a school desegregation suit proves that
there has been intentional discrimination as to some schools
in a district, a rebuttable presumption arises that it has'
affected the district as a whole.

In litigation under Title VII,

concerning unlawful discrimination in employmept, the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case by showing that the proportion of

minority persons hired varies-from their proportion in
the work force, or that employment tests have a dispropor
tionate effect on minority members, thus casting on the
defendant the burden of proving absence of discrimination
or that tests are job-related, burdens that, in fact, are
seldom overcome.
avoid a prima

The result can be, in practice, that to

facie case, the employer must seek to attain

a statistical parity that Title VII expressly states it
does not require, by means of preferences that Title VII
itself forbids.

As Justice Stevens pointed out, these

evidentiary rules derive from the difficulty, common in the
law, of proving intent and purpose directly, rather than
by inference from effect.

But the willingness to infer intent

rests as well, I think, on a suspicion that discriminatory
purpose often may be concealed by appearances of neutrality,
and a conviction that indifference to effect and discriminatory
purpose are not very far apart.
The. same problems have operated in the efforts to
remedy school segregation.

In the Swann case, the Supreme

Court stated the goal: "The objective today remains to
eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state
imposed segregation."

The command is addressed to the

necessity not only of preventing present acts of discrimination

but also of eliminating present consequences of past
discrimination -- the patterns of racially identifiable
schools that resulted from past unlawful acts.

The problem,

however, is complicated by the recognition that, to some
extent and in some, particularly urban, areas, such patterns
may have stimulated the growth of racially identifiable
neighborhoods: use of the neutral principle of neighborhood
school assignment -- the national norm -- would, where
discrimination had been practiced, merely perpetuate its
effects for some indefinite future time.

Moreoever, there

is the conviction that if the segregation that exists was
not entirely caused by official acts with respect to the
schools, it is in any event the product in major part of the
whole history of public and private acts that have occurred
in our society, and that the impact on the schools, whatever
its origin, requires remedy.

This complex of factors has led

a number of courts to cut through the knot, to convert the
Keyes presumption as to intent into an assumption that all
racial imbalance among the schools in a district is the
consequence of unlawful acts and to order, as a remedy, that
all schools reflect the racial balance of the district as a
whole.
This form of remedy, like the remedy of goals or quotas
in the employment discrimination context, has attractions:

it necessarily ensures that all vestiges of discrimination
~

have been removed, and that, for the duration of the order,
discrimination will be impossible.

But it also has costs

in the operation of the schools, in the disruption of
neighborhood responsibilities and community building, and
in the view of the child as a member of a group rather than
as an individual.
In the past two years, the Department of Justice has
attempted, through both litigation and proposed legislation,
to address this disunion between principle and practical
effect.

The positions taken in the litigation and in the

central design of the legislation are identical.

If the

purpose of a school desegregation decree, as the court
repeatedly has said, is to remove the consequences of
official acts intended to achieve and to enforce segregation
in the schools, then the effort must be made to determine as
precisely as possible what these effects have been.

The

assumption is that, in the separation of races, other factors
may .have

be~n

at work that mayor may not have been illegal,

and if illegal, perhaps can be better dealt with through
remedies directed specifically at them.

In

p~rticular,

to the

extent that separation results from discrimination in housing,
remedies must be provided to deal with thatproblem directly.
As the Supreme Court said, schools cannot bear the burden of

remedying all of the racial injustice in our society.
Instead, the remedy in school desegregation cases must be
to recreate, as nearly as possible, the situation that would
have existed had unlawful segregation of the schools not
occurred.
In both litigation and the legislative proposal, the
Department has tried to suggest procedures of adjudication
and review to ensure that the remedy will at once be rightly
limited to the violation found and yet, within the limitation,
be effective.

The Department1s position recognizes that trans

portation of students to schools distant from their homes
can be proper and, in some instances, a constitutionally
mandated remedy for unlawful acts.

But the legislation and

the Department's brief in Pasadena also make the point that
our society cannot in the long run rely on artificial

ar~ange

ments created and maintained only by judicial decree.

The

drastic remedies necessary in this area'must be designed to
allow a transition, as soon as possible, to more permanent and
natural

arr~ngements,

and the decree should provide necessary

minimum standards that give as much room as possible to
voluntary action.
The purpose of these efforts has been,

n~t

a reversal

in the law, but its elaboration and clarification.

No one

in the Department believes that its approach is an easy, or

easily implemented, answer for a problem that continues
after two decades.

Its presentation at least gives a

focus to thought and discussion about the reality of what
we are doing as a society and about what we want to do.
A thinking society, struggling for racial justice, requires
that that effort be made.

In the short and in the long run

community involvement and understanding are the most important
ingredients to a solution.
There are other unfinished items that deserve attention.
OUr criminal justice system cannot be truly strong, effective
and just until we rebuild the foundation on which it rests
the penal law itself.

Our present federal criminal law is

riddled with inconsistencies and uncertainties.

Similar

conduct is often treated with gross disparity, offending the
precept of fairness and equality.

To cite but one example,

robbery of a post office carries a maximum term of 10 years
while robbery of the federally insured bank next door renders
the offender liable to a 20-year maximum sentence.

Many of

the most important features of our penal law are not adequately
codified~

for example, the law of defenses, the requisite

state of mind for culpability and for conspiracy offenses.

These gaps in the code assume the existence of a kind of
common law.

Bu·t the development of this common law has

never been complete.

The inevitable result is that our

penal law is defined by the discretion of the prosecutor.
The treatment can be uneven and uncertain.

As Professor

Wechsler has written, the promise of the penal law "as an
instrument of safety is matched only by its power to destroy
The law that carries such responsibilities should
surely be as rational and just as law can be.

Nowhere in

the entire legal field is more at stake for the community,
for the individual."
The significant effort to codify the federal criminal
code made progress during the last session of Congress.

We

have frequently expressed the view that the provisions relating
to the

disclosurE~

tive.

Compromises were reached on this and other issues which

of govornment information were too restric

had caused controversy.

We must not assume that this project

of restatement of law, which is in one of the most important
traditions in the evolution of our law, is an impossible task.
It is, instead, an opportunity for testing and reevaluating
those elements of the criminal law that trouble us and in
some instances recodifying existing law where our efforts to
improve it are stymied either by our lack of knowledge or our
philosophical differences.

In this spirit, I believe, with

the continued cooperation of the organized bar, the project
can be completed to the lasting benefit of our society
and its legal system.
Similarly, the question of sentencing practices and
the device of parole need to be reconsidered.

The element

of chance must, to the extent it is possible, be removed
from the system both because our sense of decency demands
it and because the deterrent force'of the criminal justice
system depends upon such a reform.

The deterrent theory

of punishment does not require severe punishment.

It

requires a certainty that punishment will follow the crime,
a certainty that has been greatly eroded.

It has also been

argued that the rehabilitative function of imprisonment
will be enhanced by a sense of certainty about the term
to be served.

In such a situation entry into rehabilitative

programs would truly be voluntary and the chances of success
increased.

In the past year the Department of Justice has

taken the first step toward sentence reform by suggesting
the creation of a sentencing commission to draft standards
to control the discretion of judges in the sentencing decision.
We have also proposed the imposition of mandatory

min~mum

sentences for certain heinous crimes, with exceptions from
the requirement made in certain mitigating circumstances.

We have also suggested that it is time to discuss whether the
parole device has outlived its usefulness.
Other serious problems confront us, such as the strategy
for controlling illegal immigration while at the same time
protecting the rights of individuals in our richly multi-ethnic
society.

I know this has been an issue of considerable importance

to your association.

As we proceed in reformulating our policy

we must recognize that there is some limit to the number of
immigrants we should accept and, above all, as your report on
the subject emphasizes, that our immigration law should be fair
and enforceable.

The emphasis should be placed upon prevention

of illegal entries rather than on finding and expelling those
who have already entered and made a life in this country.

The

integrity of the immigration law depends upon strong and decent
preventive measures.

We must remember that we face the problem

of unlawful immigration because we remain the world's best hope.
Unauthorized immigrants are responding to the same human impulses
that motivated each of our forebears.

We must address the illegal

alien issue in a manner compatible with our democratic values
and our tradition as a nation of nations.
As the agenda of the Depar1:nent is inevitably unfinished,
I suppose it is also always boundless.
other issues

There are so many

the problem of gun violence, terrorism, the

overloaded criminal justice system -- that demand attention.

And there are other imperfections that will take their place
on the agenda in the future.
As I have indicated we have felt that part of the restoration
of faith in the administration of federal justice involves the
willingness to confront difficult problems, both of administra
tion and of law, and to seek out for discussion and resolution
those areas in which the law was ambiguous or in conflict.

The

preservation and renewal of our basic national values requires
of all of us this openness to discussion and this duty of
inquiry as well as impartiality of administration.

It is the

responsibility and joy of the Bar, of all of us as lawyers,
to continue the essential work of the evolving unfinished agenda
of the law.

